The effect of carbon tariffs and the associated coping strategies: A global supply chain perspective

Xiaoyang Zhou, Qiuyun Zhu, Lei Xu, Kai Wang, Xiang Yin, Sachin Kumar Mangla

Abstract: Carbon regulation differences are the main obstacle to global carbon emissions reductions. To alleviate the global environmental pressures from carbon emissions, high-carbon-regulated countries are seeking to impose carbon tariffs on imported products. In response, low-carbon-regulated countries can choose to allocate carbon quotas on manufacturers (H strategy) or provide subsidies to reduce their emissions reduction costs (S strategy). Therefore, it is worth exploring the joint impact of carbon tariffs and the associated coping strategies. In this context, this paper explores optimal manufacturing production and emissions reductions, analyses the impact of carbon tariffs on carbon emissions and social welfare, and examines strategy selection in low-carbon regulated countries. It is found that both the production and profits for manufacturers with relatively low carbon emissions reduction costs can increase with carbon tariffs. When a carbon tariff is fixed, the response strategy in low-carbon-regulated countries can either increase or decrease global carbon emissions. Carbon tariffs always have a negative impact on the social welfare of low-carbon-regulated countries. Interestingly, carbon tariffs may also harm the social welfare of high-carbon-regulated countries, especially when their manufacturers have high emissions reduction costs. Finally, as for social welfare in low-carbon-regulated countries, high-carbon-regulated countries, and the global community, both H and S strategies can be win-win strategies when emissions reduction cost subsidies are moderate. However, when emissions reduction cost subsidies are high, H strategy is found to be a win-win strategy.

Key words: Carbon tariff; Game theory; Coping strategies; Global supply chain

碳关税的影响及其应对策略：全球供应链视角

Xiaoyang Zhou, Qiuyun Zhu, Lei Xu, Kai Wang, Xiang Yin, Sachin Kumar Mangla

摘要：碳调控差异是全球碳减排的主要障碍。为了减轻碳排放对全球环境造成的压力，高碳管制国家正在寻求对进口产品征收碳关税。对此，低碳管制国家可以选择为制造商分配碳配额（H策略）或提供补贴以降低其减排成本（S策略）。因此，碳关税的联合影响及其应对策略值得探讨。在此背景下，本文探讨了制造业的最优生产和减排，分析了碳关税对碳排放和社会福利的影响，并考察了低碳管制国家的战略选择。研究发现，碳减排成本相对较低的制造商的产量和利润都可以随着碳关税的增加而增加。当碳关税固定时，低碳管制国家的应对策略可以增加或减少全球碳排放。碳关税总是对低碳管制国家的社会福利产生负面影响。有趣的是，碳关税也可能损害高碳管制国家的社会福利，尤其是当这些国家的制造商减排成本很高时。最后，对于低碳管制国家、高碳管制国家以及全球社会的社会福利而言，在减排成本补贴适度的情况下，H和S战略都可以成为双赢战略。然而，当减排成本补贴较高时，我们发现H策略是一种双赢策略。

关键词：碳关税；博弈论；应对策略；全球供应链

文章来源：Zhou Xiaoyang, Zhu Qiuyun, Xu Lei, et al. The effect of carbon tariffs and the associated coping strategies: A global supply chain perspective[J]. Omega, 2024, 122.